It is said that in the Philippines, it’s not about political ideologies but image building of a candidate. Image building is as important as political machinery to entice the voters to vote for a candidate and how it is done was discussed lengthily in the readings. At this time of mass media, marketing a candidate is of great help because this allows a candidate to penetrate and reach the voters up to even the farthest place of the hills as long as they have access to television and luckily, if they have access also to the Internet.
In this article, I intent to do the following: (1) discuss the rise of the use of marketing tools in presidential elections in the Philippines; (2) present my views on the impact of political marketing in the Philippines; (3) discuss whether crafting a slick image enough to win a presidential election; (4) compare and contrast the successful and failed presidential campaigns since 1992; and (5) present my view on what was unique in Duterte’s marketing in the 2016 elections.
Political Marketing Tools
Political marketing is probably not a new concept because even during elections before the restoration of democratic rule in 1986, presidential candidates were marketed to the voters through electoral campaigns with the use of what we probably call now “traditional campaign strategies” like the use of slogans, posters, flyers, and the like. However, with the access of the people to various media like television and the internet, electoral campaigns also leveled up thus, the concept of political marketing. As Teehankee puts it, “the application of marketing principles in politics allow for the use of standard marketing tools and strategies, such as polling research, market segmentation, targeting, positioning, strategy development and implementation.”
Analyzing the different elections discussed in the readings, 1998, 2004, 2010, and including the very recent presidential elections of 2016 using political marketing, there are probably differences as to strategies implemented. During the 1998 presidential elections where the populist Joseph Ejercito Estrada won with 39.9 percent of the vote while House Speaker Jose de Venecia with only 15.9 percent as second placer (just to emphasize the margin between Estrada and De Venecia), it was said that Estrada’s popularity was impressive. Estrada dominated all of the SWS surveys throughout the campaign period and this was attributed to his masa votes (mass support from the D and E. Estrada’s marketing campaign then was used what is now considered as one of the most successful campaign slogans in the history of Philippine presidential elections – Erap para sa mahirap or Erap (Pare) for the poor. As an actor, Estrada has portrayed in most of his movies as the champion of the masses which helped him in that election. It was his masa image that connected him with the majority of the voters at that time. That image was his primary and the most important political marketing tool because it did not stop the voters to choose him despite the negative attacks against him about his character and competence. His Erap Jokes even helped him get the sympathy of the masses.
It is important to note as well, that besides this “image” as his primary political marketing tool, Estrada’s political machinery also helped him in that election. His machinery was provided by the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), and his own party – Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP). Accordingly, the coalition Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (LAMMP) helped him get that 39.9 percent of the votes.
In addition to image and machinery is the widely-accepted fact about the advantage of bailiwick. Bailiwicks or baluarte is the candidate’s natural sphere of influence, commonly determined by his or her ethno-linguistic, regional or provincial attachments (Teehankee, 2010:118). For Estrada, his bailiwick was said to be concentrated in the Tagalog-speaking provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Rizal, Quezon, and Bulacan. He was also popular in several regions and even encroached on the regional bailiwicks of his rivals according to Coronel (2003) in Teehankee.
Meanwhile, before the 2004 elections, it should be noted that Estrada was ousted and was replaced by then Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Although unpopular towards the end of the unfinished term of Estrada, Arroyo was determined to stay in office for another six years. In this election, it was not image as the primary marketing tool of arroyo but her incumbency or her machinery, using government resources. Despite all the controversies she faced, what was also considered a factor that greatly helped win was her being a veteran of elections.
Noticed that in this 2004 elections, the image projected by supposedly another populist president Fernando Poe Jr. did not prevent the political machinery and campaign strategies of the incumbent from overtaking. Even with huge fans of FPJ and his similarity with Estrada, he didn’t capture majority of older votes.
In the 2010 elections, Filipino people was looking for change because of what was experienced during the nine-year term of Arroyo. The country went back to the era where great reform was needed for the country. Just before the 2010 elections, former President Corazon Aquino died and her followers and the clamor of the people for good governance helped her son Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III secured the presidency despite the very good political marketing strategies of Senator Manny Villar due to his “rags-to-riches narratives.” In addition, as Thompson claimed, Villar has adapted populism to a changing political environment. Villar developed a new narrative style – “applied populism.” He used television to reach millions of poor Filipinos. It was like a combination of traditional politics and populism. Also during this election, expenses of candidates in television advertisements were high and Villar topped the list of presidentiables. Nonetheless, the image of Estrada and applied populism of Villar were not enough to stop Aquino from winning.
Finally, the 2016 elections where Rodrigo Roa Duterte, Manuel Roxas II, Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares, Jejomar Binay, and Miriam Defensor-Santiago competed was also an election that demonstrated the advantage of political marketing. It was a combination of image, machinery, bailiwicks, and other competing politcal narratives. The supposedly continuation of “Daang Matuwid” by the Liberal Party candidate Roxas was no comparison with the campaign strategies launched by Duterte which can be seen as both populism and reformism.
The impact of political marketing in the Philippines
We cannot discount the advantage that political marketing can do to both the candidates and the voters. For the candidates, obviously, although can be too expensive, can be utilized to reach as many voters as possible especially with the advent of television and social media. For the voters, they can easily access the information about the candidates which can be used in deciding who to vote for during elections.
It should be noted as well that politicians should not forget the other traditional marketing tools and apply it to their electoral campaign like polling research, market segmentation, targeting, positioning, and strategy development and implementation. It’s important to know the demographics of the voters. Here, bailiwick is really a factor. Traditionally, voters would support candidates coming from their region because of the promise that help will be given to them once elected.
In sum, political marketing is really a combination of both traditional and new strategies of image building and other competing political narratives. This is why the strategies implemented by those presidents who won the election since 1992 were not similar thus, predicting which strategy is best is not the ultimate gauge. Sudden change can happen in the middle of the game just like what happened in the case of Noynoy Aquino and the buzzer beater Duterte. Although Duterte’s last minute decision can also be considered part and parcel of his political marketing.
Image building
One of the best marketing tools available that can shape the success or failure of a product (candidate) is image building. Although at the onset, it cannot be the sole predictor of success like what happened in the case of Fernando Poe Jr. and the second attempt of Joseph Estrada. The Mr. Palengke image of Mar Roxas also did not help during his stint in the presidential race in 2016. Let alone the rags-to-riches narrative of Manny Villar. However, we cannot discount the fact that “image” is an important factor to “push” the candidates to the voters. But in staging an electoral campaign, I believe it is really a combination of everything – the successful strategies of those who won the previous elections and probably market research. Knowing what your clients need will be of great help in designing and promoting a product.
Presidential campaigns of 1992, 1998, 2004, 2010, and 2016
In the table below, I would like to explain the results of the elections at least between two competitors during the 1992, 1998, 2004, and 2016 elections and three competitors during the 2010 elections.
In this article, I intent to do the following: (1) discuss the rise of the use of marketing tools in presidential elections in the Philippines; (2) present my views on the impact of political marketing in the Philippines; (3) discuss whether crafting a slick image enough to win a presidential election; (4) compare and contrast the successful and failed presidential campaigns since 1992; and (5) present my view on what was unique in Duterte’s marketing in the 2016 elections.
Political Marketing Tools
Political marketing is probably not a new concept because even during elections before the restoration of democratic rule in 1986, presidential candidates were marketed to the voters through electoral campaigns with the use of what we probably call now “traditional campaign strategies” like the use of slogans, posters, flyers, and the like. However, with the access of the people to various media like television and the internet, electoral campaigns also leveled up thus, the concept of political marketing. As Teehankee puts it, “the application of marketing principles in politics allow for the use of standard marketing tools and strategies, such as polling research, market segmentation, targeting, positioning, strategy development and implementation.”
Analyzing the different elections discussed in the readings, 1998, 2004, 2010, and including the very recent presidential elections of 2016 using political marketing, there are probably differences as to strategies implemented. During the 1998 presidential elections where the populist Joseph Ejercito Estrada won with 39.9 percent of the vote while House Speaker Jose de Venecia with only 15.9 percent as second placer (just to emphasize the margin between Estrada and De Venecia), it was said that Estrada’s popularity was impressive. Estrada dominated all of the SWS surveys throughout the campaign period and this was attributed to his masa votes (mass support from the D and E. Estrada’s marketing campaign then was used what is now considered as one of the most successful campaign slogans in the history of Philippine presidential elections – Erap para sa mahirap or Erap (Pare) for the poor. As an actor, Estrada has portrayed in most of his movies as the champion of the masses which helped him in that election. It was his masa image that connected him with the majority of the voters at that time. That image was his primary and the most important political marketing tool because it did not stop the voters to choose him despite the negative attacks against him about his character and competence. His Erap Jokes even helped him get the sympathy of the masses.
It is important to note as well, that besides this “image” as his primary political marketing tool, Estrada’s political machinery also helped him in that election. His machinery was provided by the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), and his own party – Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP). Accordingly, the coalition Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (LAMMP) helped him get that 39.9 percent of the votes.
In addition to image and machinery is the widely-accepted fact about the advantage of bailiwick. Bailiwicks or baluarte is the candidate’s natural sphere of influence, commonly determined by his or her ethno-linguistic, regional or provincial attachments (Teehankee, 2010:118). For Estrada, his bailiwick was said to be concentrated in the Tagalog-speaking provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Rizal, Quezon, and Bulacan. He was also popular in several regions and even encroached on the regional bailiwicks of his rivals according to Coronel (2003) in Teehankee.
Meanwhile, before the 2004 elections, it should be noted that Estrada was ousted and was replaced by then Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Although unpopular towards the end of the unfinished term of Estrada, Arroyo was determined to stay in office for another six years. In this election, it was not image as the primary marketing tool of arroyo but her incumbency or her machinery, using government resources. Despite all the controversies she faced, what was also considered a factor that greatly helped win was her being a veteran of elections.
Noticed that in this 2004 elections, the image projected by supposedly another populist president Fernando Poe Jr. did not prevent the political machinery and campaign strategies of the incumbent from overtaking. Even with huge fans of FPJ and his similarity with Estrada, he didn’t capture majority of older votes.
In the 2010 elections, Filipino people was looking for change because of what was experienced during the nine-year term of Arroyo. The country went back to the era where great reform was needed for the country. Just before the 2010 elections, former President Corazon Aquino died and her followers and the clamor of the people for good governance helped her son Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III secured the presidency despite the very good political marketing strategies of Senator Manny Villar due to his “rags-to-riches narratives.” In addition, as Thompson claimed, Villar has adapted populism to a changing political environment. Villar developed a new narrative style – “applied populism.” He used television to reach millions of poor Filipinos. It was like a combination of traditional politics and populism. Also during this election, expenses of candidates in television advertisements were high and Villar topped the list of presidentiables. Nonetheless, the image of Estrada and applied populism of Villar were not enough to stop Aquino from winning.
Finally, the 2016 elections where Rodrigo Roa Duterte, Manuel Roxas II, Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares, Jejomar Binay, and Miriam Defensor-Santiago competed was also an election that demonstrated the advantage of political marketing. It was a combination of image, machinery, bailiwicks, and other competing politcal narratives. The supposedly continuation of “Daang Matuwid” by the Liberal Party candidate Roxas was no comparison with the campaign strategies launched by Duterte which can be seen as both populism and reformism.
The impact of political marketing in the Philippines
We cannot discount the advantage that political marketing can do to both the candidates and the voters. For the candidates, obviously, although can be too expensive, can be utilized to reach as many voters as possible especially with the advent of television and social media. For the voters, they can easily access the information about the candidates which can be used in deciding who to vote for during elections.
It should be noted as well that politicians should not forget the other traditional marketing tools and apply it to their electoral campaign like polling research, market segmentation, targeting, positioning, and strategy development and implementation. It’s important to know the demographics of the voters. Here, bailiwick is really a factor. Traditionally, voters would support candidates coming from their region because of the promise that help will be given to them once elected.
In sum, political marketing is really a combination of both traditional and new strategies of image building and other competing political narratives. This is why the strategies implemented by those presidents who won the election since 1992 were not similar thus, predicting which strategy is best is not the ultimate gauge. Sudden change can happen in the middle of the game just like what happened in the case of Noynoy Aquino and the buzzer beater Duterte. Although Duterte’s last minute decision can also be considered part and parcel of his political marketing.
Image building
One of the best marketing tools available that can shape the success or failure of a product (candidate) is image building. Although at the onset, it cannot be the sole predictor of success like what happened in the case of Fernando Poe Jr. and the second attempt of Joseph Estrada. The Mr. Palengke image of Mar Roxas also did not help during his stint in the presidential race in 2016. Let alone the rags-to-riches narrative of Manny Villar. However, we cannot discount the fact that “image” is an important factor to “push” the candidates to the voters. But in staging an electoral campaign, I believe it is really a combination of everything – the successful strategies of those who won the previous elections and probably market research. Knowing what your clients need will be of great help in designing and promoting a product.
Presidential campaigns of 1992, 1998, 2004, 2010, and 2016
In the table below, I would like to explain the results of the elections at least between two competitors during the 1992, 1998, 2004, and 2016 elections and three competitors during the 2010 elections.
From the year 1992 to 2010, Teehankee gave a very comprehensive review of the political narratives used during the electoral campaign of the top presidential candidates. However, for the 2016 elections, my basis was our discussion in class and probably my own observation.
It can easily be obtained from the table that there is really no pattern as to what strategies is best to ensure winning the elections. During the 1992 elections, Fidel Ramos used to his advantage the image that he portrayed when he was viewed as one of the EDSA heroes. He also had the government resources at his disposal as former Defense Secretary. Meanwhile, former Agrarian Reform Secretary Miriam Defensor Santiago’s image and single-issue campaign against corruption only gave her 19.7 percent of the vote compared with the winning candidate Ramos with 23.6 percent of votes.
In 1998, Jose de Venecia, despite his access to political machinery placed second against the populist Joseph E. Estrada who garnered 39.9 percent of the votes. As discussed earlier, his masa image made him so popular and his campaign strategies which were directed to the poorest of the poor but the biggest chunk of the voting population brought him to Malacañang.
In 2004, the advantage of money, government, and party, despite the image problem or issues of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo made her won the presidency regardless of the little margin against her opponent Fernando Poe Jr., who used image as his primary campaign strategy.
In 2010, the money, image, and party of Manuel Villar Jr. did not prevent Noynoy Aquino from winning the race because of his “Daang Matuwid”, his image, and of course the effect of the death of his mother Cory Aquino.
Finally, the government advantage of Manuel Roxas II and his image and campaign promise to continue the “Daang Matuwid” didn’t play well with the reformative image and campaign strategies of Rodrido Roa Duterte.
In summary, future candidates for president must consider a combination of everything to ensure winning in the election. It seems that there’s no formula written on stone that can surely send a candidate to Malacañang. One factor that can predict the result of the election is probably what would be the outcome and trajectory of the administration before the next election whether you need to build on image or be the reformist that the people need.
The Duterte political marketing
The final part of this paper is to assess the campaign strategy used by Duterte in the 2016 elections. Although the electoral campaign strategy of Duterte was not covered in the readings, it can easily be recalled that even during the pre-election years, there was already a clamor for him to run for President. He did not give in though on the call for him to run and rumors about him running were not killed even up to the last day of filing of candidacy. Unfortunately for those wanting him to run at that time, even though Allan Peter Cayetano then made a pronouncement that “change is coming” which in turn became the image of the Duterte-Cayetano tandem, no Duterte showed up in COMELEC in Intramuros, Manila.
Duterte through his representative filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) at COMELEC after he withdrew his own COC as candidate for Mayor of Davao City. Duterte was nominated by his party PDP-Laban and as a substitute for Martin Diño who withdrew his COC on October 29. According to Duterte, his decision to run for presidency was brought about his discontentment over the decision of the Senate Electoral Tribunal against Senator Grace Poe’s disqualification case. This I think was a marketing strategy already of Duterte. The continuous clamor of the people for him to run because of his prominence as City Mayor of Davao and with what he has done in the City plus the fact that the people was dissatisfied of the performance of then incumbent President Noynoy Aquino can be considered a political strategy strengthened by the narratives of reformism and populism.
References:
Thompson, Mark R., (2010). 'Populism and the revival of reform: Competing political narratives in the Philippines, Contemporary Southeast Asia 32(1), pp. 1-28.
Teehankee, Julio C., (2010). 'Image, issues, machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines', in Yuko Kasuya and Nathan Quimpo, (Eds), The politics of change in the Philippines, Manila: Anvil, pp. 114-161.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/2c6hxmp0tlm8hs1/2017%20Contested%20Constitutions%20in%20Asia%20Lecture.ppsx?dl=0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=knWnYbGLLto
It can easily be obtained from the table that there is really no pattern as to what strategies is best to ensure winning the elections. During the 1992 elections, Fidel Ramos used to his advantage the image that he portrayed when he was viewed as one of the EDSA heroes. He also had the government resources at his disposal as former Defense Secretary. Meanwhile, former Agrarian Reform Secretary Miriam Defensor Santiago’s image and single-issue campaign against corruption only gave her 19.7 percent of the vote compared with the winning candidate Ramos with 23.6 percent of votes.
In 1998, Jose de Venecia, despite his access to political machinery placed second against the populist Joseph E. Estrada who garnered 39.9 percent of the votes. As discussed earlier, his masa image made him so popular and his campaign strategies which were directed to the poorest of the poor but the biggest chunk of the voting population brought him to Malacañang.
In 2004, the advantage of money, government, and party, despite the image problem or issues of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo made her won the presidency regardless of the little margin against her opponent Fernando Poe Jr., who used image as his primary campaign strategy.
In 2010, the money, image, and party of Manuel Villar Jr. did not prevent Noynoy Aquino from winning the race because of his “Daang Matuwid”, his image, and of course the effect of the death of his mother Cory Aquino.
Finally, the government advantage of Manuel Roxas II and his image and campaign promise to continue the “Daang Matuwid” didn’t play well with the reformative image and campaign strategies of Rodrido Roa Duterte.
In summary, future candidates for president must consider a combination of everything to ensure winning in the election. It seems that there’s no formula written on stone that can surely send a candidate to Malacañang. One factor that can predict the result of the election is probably what would be the outcome and trajectory of the administration before the next election whether you need to build on image or be the reformist that the people need.
The Duterte political marketing
The final part of this paper is to assess the campaign strategy used by Duterte in the 2016 elections. Although the electoral campaign strategy of Duterte was not covered in the readings, it can easily be recalled that even during the pre-election years, there was already a clamor for him to run for President. He did not give in though on the call for him to run and rumors about him running were not killed even up to the last day of filing of candidacy. Unfortunately for those wanting him to run at that time, even though Allan Peter Cayetano then made a pronouncement that “change is coming” which in turn became the image of the Duterte-Cayetano tandem, no Duterte showed up in COMELEC in Intramuros, Manila.
Duterte through his representative filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) at COMELEC after he withdrew his own COC as candidate for Mayor of Davao City. Duterte was nominated by his party PDP-Laban and as a substitute for Martin Diño who withdrew his COC on October 29. According to Duterte, his decision to run for presidency was brought about his discontentment over the decision of the Senate Electoral Tribunal against Senator Grace Poe’s disqualification case. This I think was a marketing strategy already of Duterte. The continuous clamor of the people for him to run because of his prominence as City Mayor of Davao and with what he has done in the City plus the fact that the people was dissatisfied of the performance of then incumbent President Noynoy Aquino can be considered a political strategy strengthened by the narratives of reformism and populism.
References:
Thompson, Mark R., (2010). 'Populism and the revival of reform: Competing political narratives in the Philippines, Contemporary Southeast Asia 32(1), pp. 1-28.
Teehankee, Julio C., (2010). 'Image, issues, machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines', in Yuko Kasuya and Nathan Quimpo, (Eds), The politics of change in the Philippines, Manila: Anvil, pp. 114-161.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/2c6hxmp0tlm8hs1/2017%20Contested%20Constitutions%20in%20Asia%20Lecture.ppsx?dl=0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=knWnYbGLLto